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Borders aŶd SovereigŶties iŶ aŶ era of ͚StatebuildiŶg Lite͛:  
International Security Assistance and the Militarization of Lebanese Border Management  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article explores how international border management strategies have implications for the 
relationship between borders and sovereignty in the Middle East after the 2011 Arab upheavals. In a 
world often described in post-national terms, where the relationship between borders, authority and 
sovereignty is in flux, how are practices of controlling and managing the border exported from one 
actor to another? How do domestic security agencies utilize global discourses of order, sovereignty 
and statebuilding, and what are the consequences for civil-military relations? By demonstrating how 
border management has become a key issue in post-2011 Lebanon, and how strategic donor priorities 
for control and directions of the wider Middle East play out along the Lebanese-Syrian border, it is 
possible to discern how global practices and discourses of border control interacts with domestic 
political realities in Lebanon.  
Borders in the MENA region have traditionally been simultaneously hard and soft: they are 
hard inasmuch as low levels of formal trade and integration, coupled with regional conflicts and 
centralised state systems, foster rigid and military control of external borders. They are also soft, 
however, since colonial border demarcation entailed arbitrary division of social groups, and created a 
practice of fluid borderlands where tribes and cross-border exchanges have rendered non-state 
governance models resilient and durable. In the wake of the Arab upheavals in 2011, we may witness 
increased pressure on regional borders, and subsequent militarisation of borders and borderlands. 
What we also observe is increased cross-border activity, and in some cases a de jure or de facto 
challenging of formal borders (Del Sarto, this issue), which further adds to the question of how changes 
at the border structure Middle East sovereignty processes. While, as Fawcett explicates elsewhere in 
this issue, the Western state model and its borders may have proven durable, challenges ͚at the 
border͛ are likely to have implications for governance and sovereignty processes in composite political 
systems.  
In the Middle East, and akin to debates elsewhere on hybrid political orders, some have argued 
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for using the term ͚hǇďƌid sovereignty͛ to describe the co-existence of traditional and state forms of 
authority.1 While certainly more apt at describing non-Western states than the weak/fragile/failed 
state rhetoric, which effectively infantilises non-Western states, such hybrid systems must be seen as 
a variant of sovereignty, rather than an alternative, where governance modalities are expressed and 
felt differently than in the Western state, and where elements of both formal and non-formal 
governance structures interact and overlap within a social space. This perspective is useful inasmuch 
as it points to the importance of a pluralist perspective on sovereignty processes which turns the focus 
on practiced sovereignty, e.g. that which is felt, that which affects people͛s everyday lives. A ͚defiĐit 
peƌspeĐtiǀe͛, as embedded in the Weak States canon, fails to recognize the productive processes 
inherent in such hybrid systems. By accepting hybridity not as an illness but as a solution to local or 
domestic collective problems, we can move beyond artificial dichotomies, and rather study political 
processes in their own right.  
This article examines eǆteƌŶal aĐtoƌs͛ engagement in border control processes, and explores 
how donors seek to reconfigure the relationship between the external border and the core in such 
Đases of ͚hǇďƌid soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛. This amounts to a reading of security assistance as a form of 
statebuilding, yet with one important difference from previous iterations: whereas statebuilding as we 
witnessed in its heyday in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Liberia and East Timor was made up of roughly 
coherent strategic concepts such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Rule of Law, institution building, and 
so forth, and where political commitment to these (supposedly) coordinated processes were 
considered sine qua non, the current version of security assistance takes place without (much) 
domestic political-strategic involvement. International security assistance – defined here as assistance 
aiŵiŶg to ͞oƌgaŶize, tƌaiŶ, eƋuip, ƌeďuild/ďuild aŶd adǀise foƌeigŶ security forces and their supporting 
iŶstitutioŶs fƌoŵ the taĐtiĐal to ŵiŶisteƌial leǀels͟2  – is typically initiated by individual donor countries, 
rather than taking place within a formally coordinated framework, and establishes direct and often 
informal links with specific domestic security agencies of choice. In this way, security assistance is 
depoliticised and decentralised, and it allows each donor to pursue its own normativities, i.e. its own 
structure of statebuilding. It is pragmatic and ad hoc. It follows non-transparent patterns of 
implementation, and it is subject to parallel strategic priorities rather than cohesive reform intentions. 
As a consequence, it is difficult to evaluate and difficult to analyse the effect of . Assemblage 
approaches helps to define the fuzzy linkages that exist. FolloǁiŶg oŶ fƌoŵ “askia “asseŶ͛s ǁoƌk oŶ 
                                                          
1 Gökhan Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq (New York: Palgrave 
MaĐŵillaŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ; “aƌa FƌegoŶese, ͞BeǇoŶd the ͚Weak state͛:HǇďƌid “oǀeƌeigŶties iŶ Beiƌut,͟ Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 30, no. 4 (2012): 655–74. 
2 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2013. Building Partner Capacity. Key Practices to Effectively Manage 
Department of Defense Efforts to Promote SA, GAO-13-335-T, Washington D.C., 14 February 2013. There are competing 
aŶd/oƌ oǀeƌlappiŶg teƌŵs, ŶotaďlǇ NATO͛s ͚MilitaƌǇ CapaĐitǇ BuildiŶg͛, the EU͛s ͚“eĐuƌitǇ “eĐtoƌ “uppoƌt/‘efoƌŵ͛. 
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how dual process of state disassembly and (global) reassembly create new forms of social interaction 
practices that reconfigure distinctions between the public/private and the global/local, Abrahamsen 
and Williams propose ͚gloďal seĐuƌitǇ asseŵďlages͛ as a ŵeaŶs to aŶalǇse hoǁ a ͞ƌaŶge of diffeƌeŶt 
security agents and normativities interact, cooperate and compete, to produce new institutions, 
practices and forms of securitǇ goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͟.3 Treating contemporary security assistance as a global 
security assemblage allows a focus on how different agents and the normativities they espouse 
iŶteƌaĐt aŶd Đoŵpete iŶ ĐoŶteǆts desĐƌiďed as ͚fƌagile͛. “uĐh ͚fƌagile͛ ĐoŶteǆts aƌe paƌticularly relevant 
as sites of global security assemblages: they are defined as weak and characterized by patterns of 
͚hǇďƌid soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛, so that state aŶd ŶoŶ-state actors interact in ways that defy conventional 
expectations to the sovereign nationstate. The current intensity in security assistance, necessitated by 
global discourses of transnational terrorism, migration and the danger of failed states, is in need of 
alteƌŶatiǀe aŶd ĐƌitiĐal aŶalǇses that ŵoǀe ďeǇoŶd eǀaluatioŶs as to theiƌ ͚suĐĐess͛ oƌ ͚failuƌe͛. 
The LeďaŶese Đase is iŶstƌuĐtiǀe ǁheŶ eǆploƌiŶg suĐh ͚stateďuildiŶg lite͛ pƌoĐesses. Seen for 
decades as a pariah state, a weak state, or even a non-state, and as a void in the otherwise state-
centric Middle East, Lebanon has emerged as a bulwark against escalating instability in the Levant, and 
has proven more resilient than expected.4 This despite the serious spill-over effects from the Syrian 
war, both in terms of refugee influxes, and a rekindling of sectarian conflicts that mirrors in part that 
of the Syrian conflict. Lebanon is however a battleground in the broader Middle East competition for 
influence, and security assistance, authorized under UNSC Resolution 1701, which call upon the 
international community ͞to support the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence 
of LeďaŶoŶ ǁithiŶ its iŶteƌŶatioŶallǇ ƌeĐogŶized ďoƌdeƌ͟,5 must be seen in the context of Iranian-
Saudi/US struggle for power over domestic political directions. Since 2006, substantial amounts of 
military aid have propped up the Lebanese Armed Forces, the police, intelligence, and other security 
agencies. This accelerated significantly after 2011, as the Middle East unravelled and strategic priorities 
of countering Jihadism and Iranian influence gave renewed relevance for security assistance in the 
region. Subsequently, external security assistance is now undertaken by nearly every European and 
North American embassy in Beirut. The modus operandi appears to be one in which each ͚doŶoƌ͛ dig 
into their ͚niche͛, supporting ͚its͛ ageŶĐǇ aŵoŶg the ŵǇƌiad of seĐuƌitǇ aĐtoƌs, in what can best be 
described as a security assistance ͚bonanza͛.6 Local security institutions, locked in a delicate system of 
                                                          
3  ‘ita AďƌahaŵseŶ aŶd MiĐhael C. Williaŵs, ͞Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International 
Politics͟, iŶ International Political Sociology, 3 (2009): p.3.   
4 N. Noe, ͞CoŶfƌoŶtiŶg the IslaŵiĐ “tate: LeďaŶoŶ͛s TeŶuous “uĐĐess aŵidst GƌoǁiŶg  Thƌeats,͟ iŶ The Islamic State through 
the Regional Lens, ed. J. Barnes-Dacey, E. Geranmayeh, and D. Levy (London: European Council of Foreign Relations, 2015). 
5 UN“C, ͞‘esolutioŶ ϭϳϬϭ͟ ;Neǁ Yoƌk: UŶited NatioŶs “eĐuƌitǇ CouŶĐil, August ϭϭ, ϮϬϬϲͿ. 
6 Security Assistance MoŶitoƌ͛s data shoǁs that U“͛ ŵilitaƌǇ aid aloŶe iŶ the peƌiod ϮϬϭϬ-2016 amounts to just over $1 billion. 
See http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Lebanon/  
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sectarian power sharing, are keen to exploit the momentum, and each agency has its ͚ diplomatic corps͛ 
of liaisons that ensure that flows of security assistance reach their departments. This security 
assistance bonanza takes place without significant political steering and control, much due to the 
polarized and unstable political situation Political instability and inability to govern effectively is partly 
endemic to the post-conflict system of power-shaƌiŶg aŵoŶg LeďaŶoŶ͛s seĐts, ďut has seeŶ fuƌtheƌ 
polarization and paralysis after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, which led to 
street violence and the formation of two competing alliances. One set of parties, the so-called March 
8 alliance iŶĐludiŶg the “hia ͚state-within-a-state͛ paƌtǇ Hezďollah, stauŶĐhlǇ suppoƌt Assad, ǁhile a 
second camp, the March 14 alliance, led by the Sunni-based Future Movement led ďǇ ‘afik Haƌiƌi͛s soŶ 
PM Saad Hariri, deŵaŶd a ďƌeak ǁith LeďaŶoŶ͛s histoƌiĐallǇ stƌoŶg ties to “Ǉƌia. The polarization has 
severe effects on Lebanese socio-political life, and for the purpose of security assistance it is notable 
hoǁ ŵuĐh of the ͚ŶiĐhe appƌoaĐh͛ is deteƌŵiŶed ďǇ suď-national politics and individual liaisons 
engaging with the donor community. In this delicate political environment, we are witnessing a form 
of ͚statebuilding lite͛: not through comprehensive peacebuilding missions. Not through politico-
economic restructuring and good governance training (although remnants of its rhetoric still exist). 
Instead, it takes place through training and equipping of the various bits and pieces of the security 
apparatus, in a modality void of coordination and strategic direction, except to prevent spill over of 
the Syrian civil war, and to gain a foothold in the geopolitical hotspot of Lebanon.   
 The article first defines the perspective of security assistance as ͚statebuilding lite͛, before 
outlining the EU Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept. It then briefly describes the current 
border management situation in Lebanon, before analysing the findings from research over 2015 and 
2016 on the effects of the EU IBM project on Lebanese sovereignty processes, i.e. how sovereignty is 
practiced and global discourses on border control interact with domestic realities, particularly related 
to counter-terrorism, territorial control, and migration management. In conclusion, the article reflects 
on how this analysis has implications for broader debates on the relationship between borders and 
sovereignty in the changing Middle East region.   
International Security Assistance and Border Management in aŶ Era of ͚Statebuilding Lite͛ 
 
Controlling international borders has morphed into an increasingly diverse practice. Far from 
witnessing their declining importance, logics of control over globalized flows in people, goods and 
intangible assets have reshaped the policy and practice of managing borders, eventually redefining the 
relationship between territory and sovereignty.7 Such a transformation move beyond linear logics, and 
                                                          
7 Peteƌ ‘ AŶdƌeas, ͞‘edƌaǁiŶg the LiŶe: Boƌdeƌs aŶd “eĐuƌitǇ iŶ the TǁeŶtǇ-Fiƌst CeŶtuƌǇ,͟ International Security. 282 (2003): 
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lead to processes where territorial border zones are seen as creating a security continuum, and even 
a ͚Möďius ƌiďďoŶ͛, which erases the distinction between inside and outside, rather than affirming any 
fixed point of separation.8 Moreover, we may observe how borders have ďeĐoŵe ͚ŵoďile͛, iŶasmuch 
as rebordering processes are to be seen across everyday life, and not only at the external territorial 
border. 9  Global-local assemblages, in which the global enters into the local in ways that defy 
conceptions of sovereign power and the state, are increasingly at the forefront of research into post-
national practices.10 
 Parallel to this transformation of the nature and effect of border processes, there is no 
shortage of actors seeking to influence border control practices of other states. A complex web of 
external/international actors are increasingly involved in border management programs across the 
globe – from ad hoc Train & Equip of border patrols in geopolitically significant regions, to long-term 
͚capacity building͛ of Customs organisations, border guards and intelligence agencies. To some extent, 
border management has become an umbrella term, encompassing the entire gamut of strategic 
priorities, e.g. counter-terrorism, counter-organised crime, migration management and territorial 
sovereignty. Given the deeply transformative rebordering processes that are taking place next to the 
surge in global flows, there is a need to analyse the nature and effects that such border management 
practices have on the political order in the respective domestic contexts. Describing the current 
pƌaĐtiĐe as ͚stateďuildiŶg lite͛ – i.e. the ad hoc, bilateral and pragmatic security assistance modalities 
that have replaced comprehensive statebuilding policies – allows for recognition of the changing 
character of contemporary security assistance, while still recognising how external actors and their 
normativities enter into local contexts. It also calls for attention to the political consequences on 
sovereignty processes, beyond technical evaluations. In many contexts where international 
interventions in border management takes place – in unstable countries where so-called ͚poƌous͛ 
borders are considered to pose threats to global security – the existing situation is often one of soft 
frontier rather than fixed hard borders. The aim of border management programs is subsequently 
often a process of turning open-ended spaces along the external rim of the state into hard and 
controllable boundaries – alďeit ǁith fleǆiďilitǇ to filteƌ ͚desiƌaďle͛ goods aŶd people foƌ puƌposes of 
                                                          
78–111; Stuart Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
ϮϬϬϵͿ, http://puďliĐ.eďliď.Đoŵ/ĐhoiĐe/puďliĐfullƌeĐoƌd.aspǆ?p=ϰϳϭϳϲϲ; Daǀid NeǁŵaŶ, ͞BouŶdaƌies, Territory and 
PostŵodeƌŶitǇ: Toǁaƌds “haƌed oƌ “epaƌate “paĐes,͟ iŶ Borderlands Under Stress, ed. M. Pratt and J. Brown (London: Kluwer, 
2002); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=457903. 
8  Didieƌ Bigo, ͞The Möďius ‘iďďoŶ of IŶteƌŶal aŶd EǆteƌŶal “eĐuƌitǇ;iesͿ,͟ iŶ Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking 
International Relations Theory, by M. Albert, D. Jacobson, and Y. Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
9 Peter Andreas and Thomas J Biersteker, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security 
Context (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
10 See Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights; Brenda Chalfin, Neoliberal Frontiers: An Ethnography of Sovereignty in West Africa 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
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trade and economic integration. Boƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategies aƌe thus Ŷeoliďeƌal aŶd ͚soft͛ iŶ 
pƌiŶĐiple, ďut ofteŶ fiŶd ƌigid aŶd ͚haƌd͛ manifestations.11  
 Border management as a part of security assistance ought therefore to be treated as a set of 
ideas that emerge in one context and is transferred to another, and which encompasses strategic 
donor priorities as well as normative structures. EU IBM, while building on the US concept of IBM as it 
developed after 9/11, seeks to introduce coordination within border agencies, integration between 
the different agencies dealing with border control, as well as ensure international coordination in a 
globalized world. The concept originated in the context of the borderless Schengen area, and has 
gƌaduallǇ ďeeŶ ƌolled out also iŶ its ͚Neighďouƌhood͛: iŶ the WesteƌŶ BalkaŶs, ǁheƌe it is seen as a 
statebuilding tool;12 in Turkey, where it has been an enlargement mechanism;13 and also in Central 
Asia aŶd the ͚“outheƌŶ Neighďouƌhood͛, ǁheƌe the ϮϬϬϵ ͚GuideliŶes foƌ IŶtegƌated Boƌdeƌ 
MaŶageŵeŶt iŶ EC EǆteƌŶal CoopeƌatioŶ͛, outline, over 136 pages, the specificities of EU best practices 
in the field of border management, including on risk analysis, data protection, and fighting 
corruption.14 In addition to the Practical Handbook for Border Guards, i.e. the ͚“ĐheŶgeŶ HaŶdďook͛,15 
and the Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, i.e. the 
͚“ĐheŶgeŶ Boƌdeƌs Code͛,16 the GuideliŶes aƌe ǁhat the iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg ageŶĐies oŶ the gƌouŶd Đall ͞ the 
ďiďle͟.17 When conceptualizing border management not as technical a paŶaĐea of ͚ďest pƌaĐtiĐes͛, ďut 
as inherently projecting a socio-political model where order and control ͚ŵaƌƌǇ tƌade aŶd seĐuƌitǇ 
iŶteƌests͛,18 we begin to discern different normativities of ͚soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛, aŶd diffeƌing ideas of order 
and governance. Key is how IBM assumes the presence of a depoliticised bureaucracy, in which each 
ministry and each border agency reports directly to a hierarchically structured Government. In such a 
model, decisions are taken at the top, and executed by institutions further down in the system. In 
many states, particularly post-conflict countries like Lebanon, specific groups dominate domestic 
                                                          
11 See Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, ͞Neoliberalizing Border Management in Finland and Schengen,͟ Antipode 45, no. 5 (2012): 1318–
36; Matthew B. Sparke, ͞A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border,͟ Political 
Geography 25, no. 2 (February 2006): 151–80. 
12 Gemma Collantes-Celadoƌ aŶd AŶa E. JuŶĐos, ͞The EU aŶd Boƌdeƌ MaŶageŵeŶt iŶ the WesteƌŶ BalkaŶs: PƌepaƌiŶg foƌ 
EuƌopeaŶ IŶtegƌatioŶ oƌ “afeguaƌdiŶg EU EǆteƌŶal Boƌdeƌs?,͟ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, no. 2 (June 1, 
2012): 201–20. 
13 DeŶiz “eƌt, ͞TuƌkeǇ͛s IŶtegƌated Boƌdeƌ MaŶageŵeŶt “tƌategǇ,͟ Turkish Policy Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2013): 173–79.; Okyay 
this volume.  
14 EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ, ͞GuideliŶes foƌ IŶtegƌated Boƌdeƌ MaŶageŵeŶt iŶ EC EǆteƌŶal CoopeƌatioŶ͟ ;Bƌussels: EuƌopeAid 
Cooperation Office, 2009). 
15 European Commission, CoŵŵissioŶ ReĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ EstaďlishiŶg a CoŵŵoŶ ͞PraĐtiĐal HaŶdďook for Border Guards 
;“ĐheŶgeŶ HaŶdďookͿ͟ to Be Used ďy Meŵďer “tates’ CoŵpeteŶt Authorities WheŶ CarryiŶg out the Border CoŶtrol of 
Persons, 2006. 
16 The Council European Parliament, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Community 
Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006. 
17 Interview ICMPD project staff, Beirut June 2015, Interview ICMPD Head April 2016 
18 Peteƌ HoďďiŶg, ͞IŶtegƌated Boƌdeƌ MaŶageŵeŶt at the EU Leǀel,͟ CEP“ WoƌkiŶg DoĐuŵeŶt ;Bƌussels: CEP“, ϮϬϬϱͿ. 
7 
 
institutions, or see institutional loyalty above political decision making, rendering the integration 
process between them an extremely delicate and political process. 19  In Lebanon, as elsewhere, 
͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛ infringes on sensitive issues of access to power by sub-ŶatioŶal gƌoups, aŶd ͚ ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ͛ 
implies sharing information of a kind that might damage allies and yield influence to adversaries. In 
many ways, Lebanon is still a post-conflict society, aŶd ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the ͚ŵutuallǇ ĐoeǆisteŶt͛ 
Lebanese sects and their political representation is still based on the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended 
the Lebanese Civil War. The basic principles of IBM therefore, enter into a dramatically different 
context than the European: as an interviewee in the Lebanese Customs complained, there is little use 
in implementing the results from risk analysis programs, when the Army opens every container it 
wishes as soon as it is outside the perimeter of the Port or Border Crossing Point.20 The current 
situation is one where competition between the agencies defines the daily work, and where a deep 
distrust between them makes the prospects of EU styled Integrated Border Management unlikely. As 
an official in EU͛s Directorate General HOME ǁoƌkiŶg oŶ IBM stated: ͞IŶ LeďaŶoŶ ǁe Đall it IBM 
ďeĐause ǁe like to Đall it so. IŶ pƌaĐtiĐe ǁe aƌe just telliŶg theŵ the oďǀious͟.21 There seems to be an 
element of truth to this blunt statement, inasmuch as it is questionable what remains of the 
sophistiĐated IBM ĐoŶĐept afteƌ ƌouŶds of ŶegotiatioŶ ǁith aŶd ďetǁeeŶ the ͚ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛. What we 
need to know then, is how the resources spent and discourses deployed impact on the political order 
in the specific context. In Lebanon, we need to engage with the characteristic hybrid political order, 
and explore how empowerment of specific agencies – via resources and discourses - impact on delicate 
domestic structures.  
 The following will first outline how security assistance enters into; gets localized; and 
eventually produce a political effect in Lebanon, before illustrating how the EU IBM project in Lebanon 
provides an example of the way gloďal disĐouƌses of ͚ďoƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ ƌeǀeƌďeƌate and gets 
instrumentalised in contexts of hybrid sovereignty. The Lebanese case corresponds to the conception 
of Integrated Border Management in the context of SSR,22 where democratic control and oversight are 
supposed to feature as the main issues,23 although it is crucial to note how these features are absent 
in the case of EU IBM in Lebanon – iŶ liŶe ǁith the ͚stateďuildiŶg lite͛ hǇpothesis.  
                                                          
19 For a discussion on norm diffusion and post-conflict contexts see Simone Tholens and Lisa Gross, ͞Diffusion, Localization 
and Contestation in Post-Conflict States: 20 Years of Western Balkans Statebuilding,͟ Journal of International Relations and 
Development 18, no. 3 (2015): 249–64. 
20 Interview Colonel in Lebanese Customs, Beirut Sea Port, 8 June 2015  
21 Interview senior official in DG Home, Brussels 17 March 2015  
22 As opposed to IBM iŶ otheƌ ĐoŶteǆts, suĐh as ǁithiŶ the “ĐheŶgeŶ aƌea, oƌ paƌt of F‘ONTEX͛ ŵaŶdate, as peƌ Otwin 
MaƌeŶiŶ, ͞ChalleŶges foƌ IŶtegƌated Boƌdeƌ MaŶageŵeŶt iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ,͟ DCAF OĐĐasioŶal Papeƌs ;GeŶeǀa, 
Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009). 
23 Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin, Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalized World (Geneva, 
Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2006). 
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Lebanon after 2011 – Security Assistance in an Era of ͚Statebuilding Lite͛   
 
Security assistance in Lebanon must be seen a part of the geopolitical struggle for wider Middle East 
control and directions. After the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, and the ensuing 
conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, UNSC Resolution 1701 authorized international 
assistance to suppoƌt the ͞territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence͟ of Lebanon, 
and reinforced the UNIFIL mission with robust peacekeepers. 24  Subsequent security assistance 
programs have flurried, and seen intensification and redirection after 2011. Total international security 
assistance from 2006-2013 to the LAF alone amounts to 1.16 billion, with a variety of actors involved: 
the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Poland, Russia, China and others.25 
Security assistance must however be seen as driven primarily by strategic interests in the region, and 
less by a comprehensive vision for the consolidation of the Lebanese security sector. Iranian and Syrian 
support for Hezbollah remains a major concern for US and Saudi interests in the region, and the Sunni-
“hi͛a ĐoŵpetitioŶ oǀeƌ doŵestic political influence renders security assistance an important vehicle in 
the wider Middle East game.  
 Iranian support to Hezbollah over three decades has created a robust, cohesive and resilient 
politico-military force, widely considered the strongest force in the country.26 The Lebanese Armed 
Forces, on the other hand, has historically been a loosely structured, poorly equipped, and politically 
divided military, and in some parts of the country, notably in Hezbollah controlled areas as well as in 
borderlands along the Syrian border, considered nothing more than an expeditionary force in its own 
country.27 The weakness of the LAF reflects that of other national institutions, which are locked in a 
delicate politico-sectarian system as set out in the Taif peace agreement that settled the long-lasting 
LeďaŶese Điǀil ǁaƌ. While the LAF͛s self-styled narrative of the only truly national institution has some 
merit, inasmuch as it is a relatively close-knit cross-sectarian (yet not non-sectarian) institution, it is 
ridden by many of the same tensions as other Lebanese institutions: inter-sect competition over 
influence, dependency on complicated political horse-trading processes, and restrictions stemming 
from the geopolitical Iranian-Saudi/US competition. Security assistance to the LAF, and any other 
Lebanese security agency is therefore a strategic policy to counter Hezbollah and ultimately Iranian 
iŶflueŶĐe, ǁhile seekiŶg to iŶflueŶĐe foƌĐe stƌuĐtuƌes that do Ŷot diƌeĐtlǇ ĐhalleŶge the “hi͛a gƌoup͛s 
                                                          
24 ‘esolutioŶ ϭϳϬϭ.͟ 
25 Aram Nerguizian, Lebanon at the Crossroads, Statement before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near 
Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs/Center for Strategic and International Studies (2014) p. 42.  
26 See for example Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah, Princeton University Press (2009), where the militia cum political 
party and social service provider is presented as the single most powerful player in Lebanon. Author interviews with political 
analysts in Beirut during four visits over 2015 and 2016 supports this view, while noting that its military engagement in Syria 
in support of Bashar al-Assad has challenged some of its legitimacy among non-core sympathisers.  
27 Nerguizian, Lebanon at the Crossroads, p.36 
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domestic interests. In addition to this approach of incrementally developing aspects of LAF capacity so 
to gradually envision an effective and truly national military force, at least three other concerns dictate 
foreign security assistance, determined principally by US policies for the Middle East: first, maintaining 
Isƌael͛s Qualitatiǀe MilitaƌǇ Edge ;QMEͿ, ǁhiĐh iŵplies ƌestƌiĐtioŶs oŶ the kiŶd of weaponry delivered; 
second, enhancing counter-terrorism capacities of the Lebanese security institutions, aimed at 
containing spill-over from the Syrian conflict specifically, and spearheading regional efforts to combat 
Jihadism generally; and finally, enhancing centralized territorial control in so-Đalled ͚ǁeak states͛.  
 
Global Priorities and Discourses of Border Management  
In this context of regional Iranian-Saudi/US competition over influence, border management in 
Lebanon offers a number of key priorities through which we can understand global-domestic 
interlinkages. In fact, it has been argued that the post-2011 prioritization of border management and 
control has enabled the LAF to strengthen its position nationally, and that a more cohesive and robust 
military is emerging.28 The stƌategiĐ laŶdsĐape aloŶg LeďaŶoŶ͛s ďoƌdeƌs is uŶusuallǇ Đoŵpleǆ, ǁith 
undemarcated borders to the South and the East, UN Peacekeepers stationed along the border with 
its hostile neighbor Israel, Hezbollah controlling significant portions of territory, and a history of fluid 
borderlands along the Northern and Eastern border. Internationally recognized borders were drawn 
up by colonial powers in 1920, while the Blue Line along the border with Israel was drawn up in 2000 
by the UN, and has become the de facto southern border. The Blue Line leaves a number of issues 
unsettled, in particular the question of the Shebaa Farms, an area that falls ǁithiŶ LeďaŶoŶ͛s 
international borders but outside the Blue Line, and which is currently located in Israeli occupied 
Syria.29 While UNIFIL is authorised to control the Blue Line, and official Lebanese security institutions 
are formally excluded from exercising authority over this border until it is demarcated, Hezbollah still 
remains territorially present in the area, engaged in on-off low-intensity confrontations with the IDF. 
Along the Eastern and Northern border with Syria, central authorities have never fully exercised 
control over territorial borders, which for decades were seen as spaces of interaction and exchange 
rather than a boundary.30 It is in these fluid borderlands that the current efforts to bolster Lebanese 
security forces are currently concentrated, driven by at least three external strategic concerns, and 
accompanying global discourses: territorial control, counter-terrorism, and migration pressures.  
The fiƌst, teƌƌitoƌial ĐoŶtƌol, eĐhoiŶg gloďal disĐouƌses oŶ the pƌoďleŵ of ͚ǁeak states͛, 
                                                          
28 Waleed HazďuŶ, ͞AsseŵďliŶg “eĐuƌitǇ iŶ a ͚ǁeak “tate:͛ the CoŶteŶtious PolitiĐs of Pluƌal GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe iŶ LeďaŶoŶ siŶĐe 
ϮϬϬϱ,͟ Third World Quarterly 37, no. 6 (June 2, 2016) 
29 For a discussion, see DaŶiel Meieƌ, ͞ The “outh Boƌdeƌ: DƌaǁiŶg the LiŶe iŶ “hiftiŶg ;PolitiĐalͿ “aŶds,͟ Mediterranean Politics 
18, no. 3 (November 1, 2013): 358–75.  
30  “ee NiĐholas BlaŶfoƌd, ͞Case “tudǇ: The LeďaŶoŶ-“Ǉƌia Boƌdeƌ͟ ;‘ethiŶkiŶg IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘elatioŶs after the Arab 
Revolutions, Universite Saint Joseph, Beirut, 2016). 
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proscribe consolidation of central authority on the fringes of the sovereign state, and have worked up 
aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŶseŶsus͛ of the Ŷeed to stƌeŶgtheŶ the soǀeƌeigŶtǇ of LeďaŶoŶ. Kaƌiŵ Makdisi 
discusses the way in which the Global War on Terror has been localized via set of UN Security Council 
Resolutions on Lebanon, and argues that narratiǀes of the ĐouŶtƌǇ as a ͚ǁeak state͛ ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe 
salǀaged ďǇ eliŵiŶatioŶ of Hezďollah aŶd the ĐoŶsolidatioŶ of, iŶ Kofi AŶŶaŶ͛s ǁoƌds, a ͞soǀeƌeigŶ, 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ͟ state, opeŶed up a ͞ǀioleŶtlǇ ĐoŶtested site of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͟, ǁhiĐh 
led to internal strife in Lebanon up until the Doha accords in 2008.31 This discussion on hegemonic 
discourses of sovereignty is particularly instructive for exploring how international border 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategies aƌe at the Đoƌe of LeďaŶoŶ͛s seĐuƌitǇ pƌiorities. Controlling the borders of 
LeďaŶoŶ iŵplies aͿ ĐoŶtestiŶg Hezďollah͛s pƌeseŶĐe aŶd iŶflueŶĐe, ǁhiĐh is iŶ liŶe ǁith ĐouŶteƌiŶg 
Iranian-Syrian influence in Lebanon; b) extending the central state to its frontier regions, thereby 
ĐoŶsolidatiŶg the ͞soǀeƌeigŶ, iŶdepeŶdeŶt aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ͟ state, tuƌŶiŶg fluid ďoƌdeƌlaŶds iŶto aƌeas 
where Lebanese institutions exercise authority and legitimacy; and c) establishing defensive 
capabilities to defend national sovereignty against external threats. Newly established Land Border 
Regiments (LBR), tasked with patrolling and monitoring the Eastern and Northern border with Syria, is 
the pƌide of LAF͛s new border strategy.32 The UK has actively supported the deployment of LBR 1 and 
2, and aided the construction of 12 Protected Border Observation Posts along 140km of the border. 
These are fitted with remote-control long-range cameras with night vision that allow clear-resolution 
images up to 20 km away, 33  allowing situational awareness to monitor these borderlands in 
unprecedented ways. The commander of the LAF has authorized the establishment of LBR 3 to cover 
a further 70km of the border south from Arsal to Tfail, with the UK supporting it through a GBP 5 
million donation.34 Part of the donated equipment is second hand aŶd ƌeĐǇĐled fƌoŵ the UK͛s stƌategǇ 
of constructing mobile border towers in Northern Ireland.35 A fourth Land Border Regiment is also in 
the making, and will cover the remaining area between Arsal and Masnaa,36 completing the military 
presence and territorial control along the northern and eastern borders. Constructing up to four new 
Land Border Regiments, a ŵajoƌ deǀelopŵeŶt foƌ a ͚ǁeak͛ aƌŵǇ suĐh as LAF, implies that soldiers are 
being trained to guard borders, a task which many would be pleased to see in the hands of civilian 
                                                          
31 Kaƌiŵ Makdisi, ͞CoŶstƌuĐtiŶg “eĐuƌitǇ CouŶĐil ‘esolutioŶ ϭϳϬϭ foƌ LeďaŶoŶ iŶ the “hadoǁ of the ͚Waƌ oŶ Teƌƌoƌ͛͟, iŶ 
International Peacekeeping 18, no 2 (2011) p.16. 
32 Interview General in the Lebanese Armed Forces, Yarzeh Military Base, Beirut 7 June 2015  
33 BlaŶfoƌd, ͞Case “tudǇ: The LeďaŶoŶ-“Ǉƌia Boƌdeƌ.͟ 
34 including 800 Personal Protective Equipment, 14 Land Rover Defenders, 5 Protected Border Observation Posts and 6 
Mobile Observation Platforms, and Radio Equipment, see FoƌeigŶ & CoŵŵoŶǁealth OffiĐe, ͞WƌitteŶ “tateŵeŶt to 
PaƌliaŵeŶt: GiftiŶg of EƋuipŵeŶt to the ϯƌd LaŶd Boƌdeƌ ‘egiŵeŶt of the LeďaŶese Aƌŵed FoƌĐes͟ ;London: UK Parliament, 
October 17, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/gifting-of-equipment-to-the-3rd-land-border-regiment-of-
the-lebanese-armed-forces. 
35 Interview Head of ICMPD Lebanon, Beirut 28 April 2016 
36 BlaŶfoƌd, ͞Case “tudǇ: The LeďaŶoŶ-“Ǉƌia Boƌdeƌ.͟ 
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agencies. The LAF has successfully capitalized on the security situation as well as taken the momentum 
under the political crisis in Lebanon to increase its military presence. Although other agencies complain 
about LAF being too dominant in border management – as aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁee said; ͞LeďaŶoŶ ƌelies too 
much on LAF – it is Ŷot Ŷoƌŵal to ƌelǇ oŶ the aƌŵǇ foƌ ďoƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt issues!͟37 – the consensus 
presented is that LAF has been able to source popular and political support for its increased role by 
emphasising the volatile situation on the ground along the Eastern border, and the LAF͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe of 
the oŶlǇ ͚guaƌdiaŶ of the ŶatioŶ͛ iŶ the Đoŵposite LeďaŶese soĐietǇ. IŶ additioŶ, its ĐoopeƌatioŶ ǁith 
external actors and the discursive emphasis on inter-ageŶĐǇ ͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛ aŶd agƌeeŵeŶt ǁith the EU 
IBM idea that soldiers now trained in IBM will one day move into civilian agencies,38 have augmented 
its status as the leading Lebanese security agency, also for internal security. However, we may also 
detect fears that such training will charge the LAF with expertise that will be difficult to undo, coupled 
with tension over competencies at the Border Crossing Points, where the LAF is increasingly 
intervening at will, both vis-à-vis cargo and people. Altogether, the discourse of territorial control has 
powerful connotations to statebuilding processes, which is paradoxical given that the majority of 
security assistance takes place outside such official statebuilding frameworks. By referring to UNSC 
Resolution 1701, and by couching the support to Lebanese security agencies in terms consistent with 
consolidating the sovereignty of Lebanon, territorial control appears as a pragmatic approach to 
statebuilding. 
 Related to the prioritization of territorial control and consolidation of sovereignty, most of the 
early post-2011 US security assistance was aimed at developing counter-terrorism capabilities for the 
fledging Lebanese Army and other security agencies.39 Besides Hezbollah, a number of Palestinian 
͚ŵilitias͛ aƌe pƌeseŶt iŶ the PalestiŶiaŶ ƌefugee Đaŵps sĐatteƌed aĐƌoss the ĐouŶtƌǇ, aŶd the ϮϬϬϳ 
battles between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp 
in North Lebanon served as a critical juncture for realizing the potential threat to national stability the 
system of hybrid governance is, as well as how severely incapacitated the Lebanese state was when 
confronted with internal security threats. Subsequent efforts to bolster the LAF have centred 
significantly on counter-terrorism, which in the post-2011 period has been increasingly about 
controlling Jihadist elements in the traditionally poor Sunni communities in the North East, in addition 
to gaining better intelligence capabilities throughout the territory. The presence of ISIS cells and 
claimed attack on mainly Hezbollah targets has also created momentum for strengthening Lebanese 
counter-terror capabilities. In 2016, as ISIS is pressured on a number of fronts, there are fears that an 
eventual retreat will point in the direction to the Lebanon, which is seen as weaker both in security 
                                                          
37 Interview external consultant (former GS General) to the EU IBM Lebanon, Beirut 5 June 2015 
38 Interview General in the Lebanese Armed Forces, Yarzeh Military Base, Beirut 7 June 2015 
39 Nerguizian, Lebanon at the Crossroads 
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and political terms than alternative regional states.40  Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, 
therefore, the Lebanese Army has increased its presence throughout the country, as well as its 
firepower: some say as much as 30-40 per cent.41 The Army seems to have been better than Hezbollah 
at countering the type of urban warfare and counterinsurgency required from irregular forces, and the 
intense training and robust equipment – modest helicopters for mobility, Cessna aircrafts for 
surveillance and reconnaissance abilities, enhanced firepower with Hellfire missiles, M198 Howitzers 
and M-60A3 and M48A5 tanks – has given the LAF a growing reputation as a credible force.42 Counter-
terrorism is however part of rebordering processes, whereby the internal-external divide becomes 
blurred, and where the many security agencies in Lebanon are competing over competence. What it 
effectively has authorised is an increasingly omnipresent Lebanese Army, whose role in internal 
security has expanded significantly since 2011. Using counter-terrorism, and its relative success in 
preventing esĐalatioŶ of ǀioleŶĐe, to fuƌtheƌ ĐoŶsolidate its positioŶ as ͞the oŶlǇ tƌulǇ ŶatioŶal 
iŶstitutioŶ͟ iŶ LeďaŶoŶ, the LAF has effeĐtiǀelǇ tapped iŶto gloďal disĐouƌses aŶd iŶteƌŶatioŶal fuŶds 
to enhance its role in domestic security affairs. In particular, the raging battles along the Northern 
ďoƌdeƌ duƌiŶg ϮϬϭϮ aŶd ϮϬϭϯ aŶd Hezďollah͛s offeŶse iŶ the QalaŵouŶ MouŶtaiŶs oŶ the EasteƌŶ 
border during 2014, have enabled the Army to build up a presence and emerging patterns of authority 
in the border areas.43 This eŵeƌgeŶĐe of a ͞ ƌeal ǁoƌld seĐuƌitǇ aŶd ďoƌdeƌ ƌegiŵe͟ aloŶg the LeďaŶese-
Syrian border is allowing the LAF to be more than an expeditionary force in its own country.44 Yet it 
also brings to the fore the contested objective of security assistance: while external, primarily US, 
support to counter-teƌƌoƌisŵ ultiŵatelǇ aiŵs at ĐoŶteŶdiŶg Hezďollah͛s ƌole iŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ, aŶd theiƌ 
control over vital cross-border supply lines, the LAF is largely content with targeting radical Sunni and 
Palestinian militias, viewing Hezbollah as a complementary military force that will be crucial in the 
event of a military confrontation with Israel.45  
 Finally, belonging to the architecture of localized manifestations of global threats in Lebanon, 
the influx of up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees is considered a threat to stability, economy and socio-
political structures. The major pressure that the presence of Syrian refugees has had on Lebanese 
communities, and the lack of sufficient international funds to aid the Lebanese in adequately catering 
to their needs, has led to an increasingly demeaning discourse of Syrian refugees as posing a direct 
threat to national security. In mid-2014, official UNHCR data reported that the number of Syrian 
                                                          
40 Interview retired LAF General, Beirut 14 December 2016 
41 Baseŵ “haďď, ͞The “ǇƌiaŶ CoŶfliĐt aŶd the AsĐeŶdaŶĐǇ of the LeďaŶese Aƌŵed FoƌĐes͟, Middle East IŶstitute, Noǀeŵďeƌ 
25, 2014 
42 “haďď, ͞The “ǇƌiaŶ CoŶfliĐt aŶd the AsĐeŶdaŶĐǇ of the LeďaŶese Aƌŵed FoƌĐes.͟ 
43 BlaŶfoƌd, ͞Case “tudǇ: The LeďaŶoŶ-“Ǉƌia Boƌdeƌ͟  
44 Nerguizian, Lebanon at the Crossroads, p.35 
45 Nerguizian, Lebanon at the Crossroads 
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refugees in Lebanon had reached 1 million. Around the same time, elections in Syria took place, with 
Syrians in Lebanon allowed to vote. The combination of politicized Syrians in Lebanon, and reaching 
the 1 million threshold led to a turning point in perceptions of Syrian refugees, and adoption of more 
restrictive policies.46 In 2014, the LAF engaged in battles around Arsal in the Bekaa valley, in order to 
retake the area from Salafists that sought to expand their territory in Syria. In these operations, dozens 
of LAF soldiers were captured, a situation that lead to claims that Syrian settlements served as breeding 
grounds for Salafism, and to a further exacerbation of the security-migration link among the Lebanese 
public. Data, albeit from before these events, shows however that there is a discrepancy between 
people͛s peƌĐeptioŶs of iŶseĐuƌitǇ ƌelated to “ǇƌiaŶ ƌefugees, aŶd theiƌ oǁŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ǁith Đƌiŵe oƌ 
other threats posed by refugees.47 Consequently, perceptions of insecurity in combination with major 
donor assistance has largely permitted the Army to tackle much of the issues related to refugees, which 
in turn has not only securitized migration but militarized the handling of migrants, including the use of 
notorious military courts to clamp down on Syrian refugees for crimes allegedly linked to national 
security.48 Besides the fact that the Army is not trained to handle vulnerable persons and perform 
internal security tasks, such a militarization of migration management has the effect of deepening the 
global migration-security nexus. European states, the European Union as well as International 
OƌgaŶisatioŶ foƌ MigƌatioŶ ;IOMͿ aŶd otheƌ INGOs iŶǀolǀed iŶ ͚soft͛ seĐuƌitǇ, doŶoƌ assistaŶĐe for 
migration management is descending on the Lebanese Army, police, intelligence agency, and customs. 
Each donor wants a piece of the pie, regardless of whether that creates competition or collaboration. 
LeďaŶoŶ͛s ŵigƌatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt has eŵeƌged as a keǇ site iŶ seĐuƌitǇ aŶd deǀelopŵeŶt assistaŶĐe, 
and the boundaries between these fields are increasingly blurred.  
In what can best be described as a bonanza – inasmuch as it takes place without overarching 
coordination and driven primarily by strategic interest rather than a well-defined national security 
strategy – doŶoƌs Đaƌǀe iŶto theiƌ ͚ŶiĐhe͛, Đoŵpeting but also cooperating in the densely woven 
politico-security landscape in Lebanon. Donor cooperation in the crowded security assistance realm is 
in theory to take place within the framework of the Support Group for Lebanon, established by UN 
Secretary General with then Lebanese President Michel Sleiman in 2013 to mobilize support for 
LeďaŶoŶ͛s staďilitǇ, soǀeƌeignty and state institutions. This mechanism is intended to ensure that 
security assistance does not overlap, and that recipients are embedded in a national security strategy, 
yet it is a common perception that it is simply allowing donors to do what they wish under the heading 
of coordination. In the meantime, the security sector expands and deepens its presence, while political 
                                                          
46 Filippo Dionigi, The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience, The LSE Middle East Centre Paper 
Series, 15 (February 2016), p. 15. 
47 International Alert, Lebanon Security Threats (2013), Beirut: Lebanon.  
48 Human Rights Watch, ͞It’s Not the Right PlaĐe for Us͟: The Trial of CiviliaŶs ďy Military Courts iŶ LeďaŶoŶ (January 2017), 
New York: Human Rights Watch.  
14 
 
crises continue to hinder effective governance and comprehensive reform. International Crisis Group 
ƌepoƌts fƌoŵ the ďesieged LeďaŶese ďoƌdeƌ toǁŶ Aƌsal iŶ the Bakaa iŶ ϮϬϭϲ: ͞Beyond the Arsal case, 
ǁhiĐh is tƌouďliŶg iŶ its oǁŶ ƌight, lies the ďiggeƌ stoƌǇ of the state͛s gradual abdication of its duties. 
As its performance on governance and representative politics grows more dismal by the day, it 
increasingly falls back on security measures devoid of any serious political, humanitarian or 
developmental component.͟ 49  Militarization has the potential to lead to a legitimization of 
dysfunctional public policy, and leave governance in the hand of non-state actors straddling the 
illegal/legitimate distinction. 
Support to border management is a broad and multifaceted activity. The US (which is the 
primary supporter of equipment and training to LAF, as well as working with the International Security 
ForcesͿ, FƌaŶĐe ;suppoƌt to GeŶeƌal “eĐuƌitǇ͛s aĐtiǀities at Beiƌut IŶteƌŶatioŶal AiƌpoƌtͿ, aŶd the UK 
(training platform with the US, and funding of situational awareness equipment to the LAF) are the 
main donors, but many other are involved in smaller projects.50 One of these is an EU project on 
Integrated Border Management. The ICMPD – a ͚faǀouƌed paƌtŶeƌ͛ of the EU oŶ ďoƌdeƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
issues – was selected for a 36 month project on introducing EU IBM in Lebanon, and the project came 
in on the tail end of a German-led Northern Border Pilot Project that had run during 2007-2008.51 
Targeting LAF, General Security, Customs and the Internal Security Forces (the police), its story 
illustrates how a small reform-oriented project enters into, is localized, and eventually reverts back 
into basic train and equip modalities when confronted with a situation of hybrid sovereignty and 
geopolitical tension. Moreover, it demonstrates how successful domestic agencies tap into global 
discourses of sovereignty, terrorism and migration in order to attract funding and assistance from 
external donors.  
 EU Ŷorŵativities ŵeet ͚statebuildiŶg lite͛  
 
Its protagonists commonly present EU IBM as a package of technical standards that enhance the flow 
of legal goods and people, while introducing techniques and equipment that enforce stringent border 
control of the illegal. However, as indicated above, it also touches on the political, and especially so in 
ĐoŶteǆts of ͚hǇďƌid soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh the ĐohesioŶ aŶd legitiŵaĐǇ of the state apparatus is very 
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International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2012). 
51 The EU IBM feasibility study was conducted in 2012 – after the outbreak of unrest in Syria, but before the major escalation 
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ibmlebanon.com/en/programme.) 
15 
 
much contested. Border management, thus, is not merely about effectiveness, but concerns core 
issues of governance, authority and discourses of power. In the following I illustrate how technical 
dimensions of EU IBM are contested in Lebanon, and demonstrate how the global border management 
discourse of ͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛ has entered into and localized in the densely woven political fabric of 
Lebanon.  
The main aim of the EU IBM project is to facilitate communication between the agencies 
involved in border control. The fouƌ seĐuƌitǇ ageŶĐies that aƌe desigŶated as ͚ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ uŶdeƌ the 
EU IBM project are the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); General Security (GS); Customs; and the Police, 
i.e. the Internal Security Forces (ISF).52 Of these four, LAF and GS have been most successful at using 
the EU IBM discourse to enhance their domestic standing. The Lebanese Armed Forces, operating 
under the Ministry of Defence, officially manage the border between the BCPs, and as we have seen 
above is the main agency for both external and internal threats in Lebanon. General Directorate of 
State Security (General Security – GS), reporting to the Ministry of Interior, is the intelligence agency 
responsible for the control of people on Lebanese territory, although their website indicates ambiguity: 
͞Fight against anything that can jeopardize security: by closely investigating all sabotage acts and 
chasing after anarchy militants, and rumour spreaders, that attempt to endanger national security͟.53 
Their ranks are akin to military ranks, and their recruits train in the same Academy as LAF soldiers. GS 
are in control of people movement across the five official land crossing points with Syria (Arida, 
Aboudieh, Boukayaa, Kaa, Masnaa), as well as on the only International Airport in Beirut as well as the 
Seapoƌts. G“ has a good ƌeputatioŶ aŵoŶg the ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶals͛ foƌ ďeiŶg pƌofessioŶal aŶd Đoŵŵitted, 
and has a neatly structured internal organisation, which makes it ͞easier to cooperate with than some 
of the other agencies͟.54 Contrary to the multi-sect LAF, the head of GS is according to the Lebanese 
constitution a Shia Muslim, and the agency is as such seen as affiliated with Hezbollah55 - although the 
actual practical links between the two are not straightforward. The current head of GS, Abbas Ibrahim, 
is seen as a figure that seeks to depoliticize GS, making it into an agency with influence beyond a strictly 
sect-based role,56  ǁhiĐh fuƌtheƌ eŶhaŶĐes doŶoƌs͛ ǁilliŶgŶess to suppoƌt it. The ǁaǇ doŶoƌs aƌe 
currently working with GS to strengthen its capacities – through training and equipment, particularly 
                                                          
52 Lebanese Civil Defence was in 2015 included as a formal beneficiary, but has little relevance in terms of political influence 
and so is excluded from the present analysis  
53 ͞FuŶĐtioŶs of the GeŶeƌal “eĐuƌitǇ,͟ General Directorate of General Security Homepage, accessed November 30, 2016, 
http://www.general-security.gov.lb/en/posts/3. 
54 Interview external consultant to the ICMPD EU IBM Lebanon project, Beirut 5 June 2015 
55 The head of the GS was in June 2014 the target of a suicide attack by (presumably) Sunni armed groups at a checkpoint in 
the Bekaa valley along the Beirut-Damascus highway. Sunni Muslim armed groups are fighting to topple the Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad and have been targeting his key Lebanese ally, the Shia group Hezbollah. This goes to tell that the GS and 
Hezbollah are considered as overlapping by Shia adversaries.  See 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/two-killed-suicide-blast-lebanon-201462084724664691.html 
56 Interview analyst at Carnegie Middle East Centre, Beirut 11 November 2015  
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at BCPs and at the Airport, but also via sophisticated intelligence technology – may yield more 
influence to the primarily Shia agency in the medium term. In addition, Lebanese Customs, responsible 
for controlling and taxing goods crossing through land, sea and air crossing points, and the Internal 
Security Forces (ISF), the police agency responsible for counter-crime notably trafficking in drugs and 
people, aƌe EU IBM ͚ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛. The Customs institution operates under the authority of the 
Ministry of Finance, whereas the ISF is under the Ministry of Interior. The EU IBM project was initially 
working closely with Customs, as they are seen as vital to the neoliberal notion of filtering desired 
goods, while prioritizing the fight against organised crime, but there is not much political support for 
Customs in Lebanon, and an internal conflict between the military and the civilian branches of the 
Custoŵs depaƌtŵeŶt has haŵpeƌed ŵuĐh of the ageŶĐǇ͛s aďilitǇ to paƌtiĐipate iŶ EU IBM aĐtiǀities.57 
While the internal fighting in the Customs services between the ͚civilians͛ and the ͚brigades͛ continues 
to haŵpeƌ that ageŶĐǇ͛s fƌuitioŶ, the Custoŵs ďƌigades aƌe ĐloselǇ ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith theiƌ offiĐeƌ Đolleagues 
in LAF, GS and ISF, with whom they share education from the Military Academy as well as operational 
culture.58 ISF on the other hand has not so far participated much in EU IBM activities, partly due to it 
ďeiŶg tƌaiŶed aŶd ŵeŶtoƌed ďǇ otheƌ iŶteƌŶatioŶal stakeholdeƌs. It is seeŶ as a ͞Haƌiƌi ĐƌeatioŶ͟, 
meaning that its legacy of being supported by the Sunni political party ͚Futuƌe MoǀeŵeŶt͛ of late ‘afik 
Hariri (currently headed by his son, PM Saad Hariri) has rendered it too politically marginal to gain 
widespread support in society. ISF is in fact the institution that enjoys the least trust among Lebanese, 
with under half of the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ĐitizeŶs tƌustiŶg the poliĐe, although it varies from over 90% in Rashaya 
to just 10% in Tyre according to perception surveys.59  
 
Sovereignty by stealth: IBM in contexts of hybrid security  
Sovereignty processes implies a broader conceptualisation of governance than strictu sensu state 
governance. In the case of Lebanon, hybrid sovereignty has been used to describe the complex 
interaction of state and non-state political authority, and the ensuing hybrid security situation that 
most people live on a daily basis, including formal state security agencies, municipalities, tribal or 
unofficial community councils, private security companies, militias, and religious authorities. However, 
for the purpose of capturing how security assistance affects the composite system of security 
governance in Lebanon, the following demonstrates how EU normativties encounter hybridity even at 
the level of formal state institutions.  
                                                          
57 Interview Colonel in Lebanese Customs, Beirut Sea Port, 8 June 2015  
58 Interview Colonel in Lebanese Customs, Beirut, 27 April 2016. The conflict between the civilian and military branches of 
Customs is essentially one over organisational culture and access to leadership positions. The conflict between the civilian 
leadership and the military brigades deteriorated throughout 2015 and 2016, to the point where the civilian authority no 
longer approved ICMPD training for the brigades  
59 Daǀid Chuteƌ, ͞PeƌĐeptioŶs aŶd PƌesĐƌiptioŶs: Hoǁ LeďaŶese People Vieǁ Theiƌ “eĐuƌitǇ͟ ;IŶteƌŶatioŶal Aleƌt, FeďƌuaƌǇ 
2015), 5. 
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The creation of a Border Control Committee (BCC), in which representatives of the four above 
mentioned agencies as well as ICMPD, IOM and other international stakeholders meet weekly to 
discuss the border situation and divide labour in a coordinated manner is considered a major step 
towards opening up lines of communication between the four security agencies. It would have been 
unthinkable only a few years back, explains an external consultant to the project (a former general in 
LeďaŶoŶ͛s GeŶeƌal “eĐuƌitǇͿ, that ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes fƌoŵ the four agencies would come together and 
reveal information regarding their activities, let alone coordinate.60 The BCC has developed into an 
established framework of cooperation, and has created a modicum of communication between the 
agencies. This is attributed partly to the Head of the BCC, LAF General Samir Azi, who is seen as a strong 
figure supportive of the IBM idea, and which enjoys respect by all the involved agencies.61 The fact that 
it is headed by the Army means that the BCC enjoys importance and influence, but also what was 
shown above, that the LAF is keen to steer external initiatives in its favour. There is however a 
conspicuous missing link between the BCC and the political level, making the BCC appearing as  a 
technical coordination mechanism, rather than integrating also the political level – which is very much 
iŶ liŶe ǁith the ͚stateďuildiŶg lite͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe. The focal points for the four agencies are appointed by 
their respective Ministries and by now have an established working relationship. Yet so far, the 
coordination does not trickle down through the system: each agency has many departments, and the 
ďuƌeauĐƌatiĐ stƌuĐtuƌes aŶd ͚ŵilitaƌǇ ŵeŶtalitǇ͛ ŵeaŶs that eǀeƌǇthiŶg aŶd eǀeƌǇoŶe Ŷeeds 
authorization - inevitably a very time consuming and complicated process.62  
Meanwhile, protectionism continues to define inter-institutional relations. In particular, the 
issue of a shared database, in which the four agencies would share intelligence on threats and 
operations, has been expressively refused,63 indicating the level of competition and mutual scepticism 
that exists. The issue of intelligence is particularly delicate in Lebanon. Until the Syrian withdrawal in 
2005, Lebanese security agencies were largely inhibited from developing intelligence capabilities. The 
lack of good intelligence became obvious during the 2007 clashes between LAF and Fatah al-Islam in 
the Nahr Al-Baƌed PalestiŶiaŶ ƌefugee Đaŵp iŶ Noƌth LeďaŶoŶ, iŶ ǁhiĐh ͞theǇ had Ŷo Đlue͟ ǁhat the 
situation on the ground was.64 Since then, all Lebanese security agencies have developed intelligence 
channels, and actively use grassroots informants particularly from troubled villages and towns. Yet 
they operate independently and in parallel, with each agency recruiting its own informants, and each 
agency cooperating with different external intelligence agencies. A joint intelligence sharing database 
                                                          
60 Interview external consultant to the ICMPD EU IBM Lebanon project, Beirut 5 June 2015  
61 Interview Head of ICMPD, Beirut 28 April 2016.  
62 Interview external consultant to the ICMPD EU IBM Lebanon project, Beirut 5 June 2015 
63 Interview Head of ICMPD, Beirut 28 April 2016 
64 Interview former UNIFIL spokesperson, Beirut 27 April 2016 
18 
 
is certainly an alien concept in such a hybrid security environment. Even if external intelligence 
agencies would very much like to tap into these localized networks, it continues to be resisted and 
traded for special relations rather than absorbed in a national structure. Having said that, information 
sharing and coordination of activities do take place, every day and between all agencies. However, it 
works on an informal, verbal, and non-linear logic. As any meeting with senior officers may illustrate, 
there is a consistent reliance on mobile phone communication, with each officer carrying at all times 
2-4 phones, displayed on the table in front of him, continuously ringing. These unscripted lines of 
communication are the modus operandi of Lebanese security operations and cooperation, and evade 
any attempts at codification and formal procedure, much to the frustration of the EU and other donors. 
Yet, they are to some extent functioning and effective for the purpose of Lebanon, and driven by 
interpersonal synergy and established patterns of coordination based on experience rather than 
formal mechanisms. As a Customs Colonel at Beirut Port eǆplaiŶed: ͞ I ĐooƌdiŶate ǁell ǁith I“F, ďeĐause 
I went to the Academy with the Captain in charge of the Beirut counter-drug division͟.65 
Another example of how EU IBM ͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛ has ďeeŶ ƌeiŶteƌpƌeted iŶ LeďaŶoŶ is the typical 
EU approach to Strategic doctrine. As a part of Phase 1 of the project, a National IBM Strategy was 
drafted in partnership between ICMPD and the four agencies, but this (as of early 2017) has not yet 
been formally approved by the Government, and is, according to EU IBM staff, ͞dustiŶg aǁaǇ iŶ the 
dƌaǁeƌ of soŵe ŵiŶisteƌ͟.66 This is partly due to political crises that characterise Lebanese politics, and 
which has prevented cohesive governing for several years. From a presidential vacuum to the garbage 
crisis, the central government has effectively been unable to govern, and therefore also to take the 
lead in its security governance. However, the National IBM Strategy has been approved by the four 
relevant agencies, and sees backing at the institutional level. It is used as a reference for their joint 
activities, and must be seen as having some success in ͞ integration fƌoŵ ďeloǁ͟.67 Here we may detect 
a form of localization of typical EU IBM approach to border management, in which the result is basic 
modes of cooperation between the agencies, yet without approval and engagement by the political 
level. As the Head of the ICMPD could testify to, there was considerable opposition in the beginning 
eǀeŶ to the use of the ǁoƌd ͚stƌategǇ͛, as it ǁas seeŶ as requiring political involvement of a sort that 
often complicates matters significantly in Lebanon.68 The fact that such a National IBM Strategy has 
been produced and agreed on by the four border agencies is a sort of Lebanese approach to effective 
governance, and it is observed that it is implemented by the agencies even without the political 
                                                          
65 Interview Colonel in Lebanese Customs, Beirut Sea Port, 8 June 2015 
66 IŶteƌǀieǁ ICMPD EǆteƌŶal eǆpeƌt, MasŶa͛a Boƌdeƌ CƌossiŶg PoiŶt, ϭϭ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ  
67 Interview Head of ICMPD, Beirut 28 April 2016 
68 Interview Head of ICMPD, Beirut 28 April 2016.  
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sanctioning (and financing) originally foreseen.69   
A final example of how IBM has entered Lebanon is the Masnaa BCP, which was recently 
refurbished according to a European model of design. However, as the agencies moved in, GS and 
Customs decided where they wanted to be stationed based on ideas of control and relative power 
relationships. It proved useless to try to refer to the efficient outline of the BCP – the agencies have 
clear ideas about where they should be stationed.70 For example, there are three border checks at 
Masnaa: at the first, GS checks the travel documents of passengers, at the second Customs check the 
goods, and at the third, GS checks again passengers. This third border check is due to mistrust in their 
personnel, according to an EU IBM external expert, and should be eliminated for enhanced efficiency 
at the BCP.71 Henceforth, even in the physical, we have a conflict between an external model of IBM, 
where the BCP serve as a facilitator of trade and flow of people, and the manning of the post which in 
practice follows internal principles of control and balance of power.  
IŶ ĐoŶĐlusioŶ, ǁe ŵaǇ oďseƌǀe that ͚iŶtegƌatioŶ͛ has ďeeŶ takeŶ up ďǇ diffeƌeŶt LeďaŶese 
security agencies. Yet, it is clear that integration is such a far removed principle from the Lebanese 
reality, that much of the uptake has been discursive – successfully used to befriend external donors by 
the relevant security agencies. As an official in the planning department of GS described the situation: 
it is as ͞ operating in two parallel universes͟ when working with the EU IBM, whereby, on the one hand, 
the daily survival of the GS goes on, with all the politics and daily negotiation that it implies, while on 
the otheƌ haŶd, oŶe is atteŵptiŶg to thiŶk iŶ teƌŵs of this ͞ǀeƌǇ ŵatuƌe ĐoŶĐept͟ of IBM.72  
Integration as a core EU normative concept for governing borders is therefore met by a process 
of ͚soǀeƌeigŶtǇ ďǇ stealth͛, iŶ ǁhiĐh iŶǀisiďle fault liŶes of doŵestiĐ goǀeƌŶiŶg pƌiŶĐiples aƌe pƌaĐtiĐed 
without formal scripts or strategic doctrine. Typical of geopolitical hotspots and for the Lebanese sui 
generis case, security assistance will enable external actors to influence domestic politics on ill-defined 
terms, and domestic actors will take advantage of the opportunities provided in ad-hoc and 
instrumental ways.  
Conclusion: Borders and Sovereignty in an era of Statebuilding Lite 
 
This paper has described how International security assistance is channelled into a divided, complex 
and sectarian Lebanon that is deeply affected by the war in Syria. To put it crudely, we are confronted 
with a situation where the Lebanese security institutions operate in a jam-rocked space between ISIS 
                                                          
69 Interview Head of ICMPD, Beirut 28 April 2016 
70 Interview ICMPD external eǆpeƌt, MasŶa͛a Boƌdeƌ CƌossiŶg PoiŶt, ϭϭ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ 
71 IŶteƌǀieǁ ICMPD eǆteƌŶal eǆpeƌt, MasŶa͛a Boƌdeƌ CƌossiŶg PoiŶt, ϭϭ Noǀeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ 
72 Interview Brigadier General in General Security, Planning Department, Beirut 6 June 2015  
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on the one side, and IBM on the other. Observers might say it is a bad moment to be expecting 
integration, professionalism and compliance with IBM standards. Yet, research shows that the urgency 
of the situation is exactly what has prompted collaboration – if not integration – between the different 
institutions governing the border area between Lebanon and Syria. As such, Lebanon has undergone 
significant change in the way that the periphery relates to the core. Whereas the Eastern border has 
been historically porous and connecting two peoples that some claim were divided by colonial powers, 
it has increasingly come to be seen as a militarized buffer between the war in Syria and the relative 
calm of Lebanon. Masnaa Border Crossing used to be a buzzling node on the highway between 
Damascus and Beirut, connecting two centres through overlapping borderlands. Now, it is a node on 
a North-South running boundary that divides a ͚zoŶe of ǁaƌ͛ fƌoŵ a ƌelatiǀelǇ staďle LeďaŶoŶ.  
In this story, EU IBM aŶd the ďƌoadeƌ seĐuƌitǇ assistaŶĐe ͚ďoŶaŶza͛ that is takiŶg plaĐe has 
contributed to shifting the view of the external rim of Lebanon from a frontier to an emerging 
boundary. Frontiers and boundaries are significant elements of state formation, yet their relationship 
to the centres of power are different: where borders are inward oriented, defining that which lays 
within in opposition to that which remains outside, frontiers are outward oriented, connecting, 
extending and blurring territory and authority. The Lebanese-Syrian border has in this sense gone from 
constituting a frontier to a boundary over the course of a few years. LeďaŶoŶ͛s hǇďƌid soǀeƌeigŶtǇ 
architecture is key to unpacking how each security agency – Hezbollah in particular of course, but also 
the many formal Lebanese security agencies – is capable (or not) of profiting from the willingness of 
international donors to strengthen the Lebanese bulwark against expansion of the Syrian unrest. The 
effect is a militarised and securitised state, featuring empowered and competing security institutions 
that gain foothold throughout the state in the absence of political authority at the central state level. 
Such ͚statebuilding lite͛, circumventing strategic and political channels, and relying on ad hoc and 
pragmatic coercive state power, is effectively deepening the hybrid security situation so characteristic 
of the Lebanese state. In an era of ͚statebuilding lite͛, therefore, the effect is likely to be an enhanced 
military, whose expanded competences will prove hard to undo. In Lebanon, the rising importance of 
the Army might have a positive effect on sectarian politics in the short term, but a militarization of 
Lebanese politics is proving to have an adverse effect on governance and state-society relations at 
large. 
